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Margaret Urban Walker
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In her book Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Martha Minow
begins a chapter on reparations with a brief discussion of restorative
justice. She characterizes restorative justice as seeking “repair of
social connections and peace rather than retribution against
offenders;” she describes it as “building connections and enhancing
communication between perpetrators and those they victimized, and
forging ties across the community...”1 Later in the same chapter,
however, when talking about monetary reparations Minow says the
“core idea” behind reparations is compensatory justice, the view that
“wrongdoers should pay victims for losses” to wipe the slate clean.2
Several recent discussions of reparations for historical injustice
and mass political violence reject the idea that compensatory or, as I
will call it, corrective justice is the relevant or primary category for
reparations involving groups or large numbers of individual victims of
injustice.3 Roy Brooks considers the “tort model” of pursuing
compensation from institutions and private parties through legal action
a secondary, morally deficient and relatively unpromising avenue. He
advances an “atonement model” of reparations premised on “the postHolocaust vision of heightened morality, victim-perpetrator identity,
egalitarianism, and restorative justice.”4 Although Brooks does not
define restorative justice, his account of atonement makes apology
central and sees monetary and other reparations as necessary to make
apologies believable. Janna Thompson situates her argument for
historical obligations to repair past wrongs, such as the theft of lands
from indigenous people or the injustice of slavery, in a conception of
“reparation as reconciliation” in contrast to a “legalistic” one of
“reparation as restoration.” The aim of reparations on this view is “to
repair relations damaged by injustice–not to return to a state of affairs
that existed before the injustice was done.”5
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Ruti Teitel, in her extensive study of transitional justice practice, finds
that “reparatory practices have become the leading response in the
contemporary wave of political transformation,” but that reparatory
practices in political transition “defy categorization as either criminal or
corrective justice” by both redressing individual rights violations and
signifying responsibility for criminal wrongdoing.6 Naomi Roht-Arriaza
appeals to “a basic maxim of law that harms should be remedied” in a
discussion of reparations for mass violence, but argues that individual
court-ordered reparations are both impractical in cases where there
are many victims and inadequate to address collective elements of
harm in situations of mass conflict or repression where communities
are targeted for violence and are sometimes made complicit in
atrocities.7 She advocates collective reparations, like community
development, community participatory adjudication or preferential
access to services, while recognizing that such collective measures
may fail adequately to address or protect victims of political violence.
Discussing cases of mass violence and repression, Pablo de Greiff
makes the most extensive and pointed argument against a “juridical”
approach to reparations that aims to re-establish the status quo ante
by proportionate compensation for harms. Compensating for harms on
this legalistic conception entails problems of quantification and
generalization of harms, as well as interpersonal comparisons of
suffering, creating divisive hierarchies of victims and clouding the
relationship of reparations programs to other justice measures. He
proposes an expressly “political” conception of reparations programs
that measures their effectiveness in terms of social justice; reparations
programs should express and create conditions for recognition, civic
trust, and social solidarity between victims and others in societies
undergoing political transition.8
The field of application for reparations is broad, comprising
cases where wrongs are discretely episodic and the concrete means of
repair (for example, monetary compensation) are fairly
straightforward, cases of gross and murderous violation of massive
numbers of human beings during a specific period of political
repression or persecution, and group histories of destruction,
dispossession, subjugation and degradation of status that span
centuries. The nature and background of particular cases of injury, as
well as the foreground of current social relationships and practical
political possibilities, matter decisively for how injury and responsibility
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are apt to be understood, and what measures of repair are apt to be
available and meaningful. I do not wish to deny that what many
writers call a “legalistic” or “juridical” understanding of reparations–
basically, reparation as an exercise of corrective justice–might be
usefully applied in some cases. Nor do I attempt to draw a single line
of demarcation between cases where corrective justice will serve
adequately as a model for reparation and those to which it is wholly
inapt. I propose to explore an alternative to corrective justice as a
framework for reparations in certain kinds of cases.
Although there is no consensus on even a formal
characterization of corrective justice, conceptions of corrective justice
as a moral ideal suppose a moral baseline of acceptable conduct or
due care and regard for the security, dignity or well-being of others.
Corrective justice demands “correction” of what are presumed to be
discrete lapses from that prior or standing moral baseline in particular
interpersonal or institutional transactions with individuals, or
unacceptable impacts of the action or omission of some individuals
upon others.9 For this reason, corrective justice may be at least
artificial and perhaps incoherent in addressing histories, acts or forms
of injustice that consists in radical denial of moral standing or in
relentless enforcement of degraded moral status of individuals,
especially when these are systemic conditions and persist over
extended periods of time. Conditions of moral exclusion and
degradation, typically embodied either in legal exclusion from certain
standings, the absence of political rights or the enforcement of
diminished political and civil status, are invariably based on group
membership defined either by putatively natural or elective attributes
(race, gender, ethnicity, religious creed, disability, sexuality) or by
proscribed political activity or membership. These conditions may
endure for centuries (histories of dispossession and cultural and
physical destruction visited on indigenous people by European
colonization) or be relatively transient (political persecutions under
particular regimes).
The “problem of the baseline” is not adequately comprehended
by corrective justice. Rather, I will argue, it is the construction of
morally adequate relations in and through the establishment of
defensible and shared moral baselines that is a requirement of justice
in certain cases, along with reparation for the manifold effects of the
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absence or unacceptability of such baselines and the usually repetitive
failure to recognize, admit, or correct. Restorative justice, I will argue,
is a more adequate framing ideal for reparative practice where there is
a need to establish a governing understanding of “right relationship”
and to approach its realization, rather than to intervene episodically to
correct deviations from an existing standard. I will explore some ways
that restorative justice is more instructive concerning what injuries of
denial and degradation involve, and so what it means to address and
redress them, as well as whose responsibility it might be to do so. I
will argue that restorative justice accommodates and perhaps requires
bottom-up and incremental attempts at repair as a social and political
process, a process that may be signified but is not exhausted by a
particular reparations program or reparative gesture like a public
apology. I identify six core values of restorative justice and explain its
guiding aim of “restoring relationships.” I examine a distinctive
orientation within restorative justice to compensation as one among
many means to repair, to articulating wrongs and harms fully, to
processes that “leverage” responsibility, and to the active role of
communities of varying types in doing justice. The case I address
briefly in conclusion is that of African-American reparations.

Corrective Justice and the Moral Baseline
Critics of a corrective justice model of reparations – whether
they call it “legalistic,” “compensatory,” “juridical,” or “reparatory” –
find conceptual, practical, political and moral grounds for criticism.
Conceptually, it is fair to say, as de Greiff does, that corrective justice
tends to focus on mechanisms of restitution or compensation and to
emphasize some representative relationship, usually “proportionality,”
between compensation and injury. It is not easy to pry corrective
justice thinking away from legal paradigms of compensating for undue
loss and injury, although often compensation in political or historical
cases is apt to be, and perhaps in the interests of political feasibility
and social solidarity must be, symbolic. Practically, dealing with
compensation for very large numbers of victims of political violence or
oppression poses financial burdens and political snares in many
transitional contexts where reparations compete for limited resources.
Administrative arrangements for implementing reparations
mechanisms can become costly, divisive and demoralizing if they are
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too fine-grained in vetting eligibility. In some cases, like histories of
chattel slavery, sexual enslavement or genocide, the meaning of
compensation is powerfully shaped by the larger frame: other gestures
of recognition, acknowledgment, atonement, memorializing, social
support and guarantees of prevention determine whether financial
compensation sends an acceptable and dignifying message to victims
and perpetrators, as well as to society generally. It may often be these
other nonmonetary measures that are possible, valuable, and
necessary, whether or not monetary compensation is likely or wise.
Reparations policies must be politically feasible, but neither can they
appear as cheap buy-outs or fail to address victims directly and to
validate their experience of suffering and specific experience of
injustice, lest they add further moral insult to moral and material
injury. The balance of individual and collective reparative measures,
and delicate matters of fit among monetary, service, and rehabilitation
packages and more symbolic gestures, can seem to outstrip the rather
basic idea of a “give back” that has dominated corrective justice
thinking since Aristotle. These problems are real and pressing but they
might be understood as symptoms of a deeper issue. The framework
of corrective justice strains, because it has never been meant to deal
with either a massive scale of serious mayhem or a protracted and
brutal subjugation and mutually ramifying indignities and atrocities
that characterize oppressive and violently repressive systems. But
what is the “framework of corrective justice”?
There is no canonical formal characterization of the kind of
justice that sets right wrongful or undue losses and injuries any more
than there is a single accepted terminology. Some writers emphasize a
right to reasonable security from undue losses imposed even by
others’ nonculpable acts while others delimit the occasions for
corrective justice to cases of wrongdoing or the violation of rights.10
Some see corrective justice as a remedial mechanism to restore just
distributions, while others see corrective justice as more autonomous
and directed to maintaining a basis for stable expectations that
facilitate social cooperation in various interactions, at least to some
extent independently of the justice of underlying distributions.11 A
common function of corrective justice in numerous accounts, however,
is that there is a standard of moral acceptability for the impact we
have on each other through our actions and interactions, and that
corrective justice responds to correct those impacts of action and
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interaction that fall outside of that standard of moral acceptability,
however it is characterized. This is the standard I call the moral
baseline, and it may be set in terms of just distribution, a kind of right
or rights, a norm of fairness, standards of due care and attentiveness,
or the dignity and respect-worthiness of persons.
Unsurprisingly, contemporary authors are inclined to
characterize the moral baseline of corrective justice in the language of
moral equality. Gerald Gaus describes compensatory justice as aiming
at restoration of “moral equality.”12 Bernard Boxill’s early piece on
black reparations sees justice as requiring equal consideration between
equals, and so an acknowledgment of the error of treatment that fails
to respect equality and a reaffirmation of belief in equality of the
injured party.13 It seems possible, however, for corrective justice to
function as a principle in societies with differentiated and even
hierarchically organized statuses with reciprocal but not symmetrical
obligations and responsibilities; there, too, there will be due and
undue treatment and recognition, and so a need for redressing
interactions and impacts that deprive some parties of what they
rightfully claim. Hammurabi’s laws, for example, include many specific
rules not only for punishing prohibited acts but also for correcting
transactions involving slaves and masters, husbands and wives,
parents and children, who are not supposed to enjoy equality of status
in the modern sense.
There is, then, a duality within corrective justice. Its moral
function might be described as defining and preserving reciprocity and
responsibility between individuals (or groups) for their actions and
impacts on each other in certain respects (identified by particular
norms) in a social order defining proper places and allowing stable
interpersonal expectations.14 Yet the norms that set the baselines for
acceptable treatment and due care and attention that give corrective
justice its specific content – what actions or impacts it is a requirement
of justice to correct, and what reparative actions will constitute
correction – may themselves be morally indefensible; at the extreme,
an assumption of reciprocity may be absent. When norms define
unequal statuses based on bogus forms of innate superiority,
fabricated natural hierarchies of authority or natural divisions of talent
and interest, or when they opportunistically deny rights or effective
protection and remedies to powerless, despised or stigmatized groups,
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then indefensible moral baselines of corrective justice, or the absence
of moral baselines with respect to members of some despised group,
becomes part of that for which justice requires a remedy. Corrective
justice is only as morally legitimate as the baselines it treats as
morally compelling. The legitimacy of baselines becomes an issue in
cases of gross or systemic mistreatment or deprivation of rights
characteristic of oppressive social structures and, in somewhat
different ways, in political episodes where states, often with some legal
basis (“emergency powers”), terrorize or mistreat segments of their
own population. Societies over time may come to adopt more
justifiable baselines that move toward more uniform recognition of
equal worth and dignity of all members. This recognition of equal
dignity sets the stage for addressing the problem of faulty baselines
that both license unjust treatment and are a cause of it. It does not,
however, solve this problem, although measures that acknowledge
precisely that situation we might expect to be part of what corrective
justice demands.
Corrective justice uses its moral baseline to identify and attach
obligations of repair to faulty performance under the standards, not to
faulty standards. Furthermore, corrective justice, if it is to be a basis
for reparations, requires principles that can span cultural and national
communities. While international and humanitarian law and evolving
best practices purport to set a universal standard of moral equality, it
is an aspirational standard that does not and in many instances cannot
define stable expectations for those whose more local communities
and cultures, legal and social, play by very different rules. Thus, the
framework of corrective justice seems to predicate the normal
operation of legitimate standards of conduct and impact in order to
secure performance or repair for failure in, or untoward outcomes due
to, the performance of actors. It is not accidental that one analysis
that clearly identifies the problem of the baseline is Andrew Sharp’s
study of the search for justice between Maori and Pakeha people of
New Zealand. Sharp adopts a legalistic conception of restitution and
compensation, but incorporates not only the idea of “reciprocal
exchange between two equal parties” in his definition of reparative
justice, but also the proviso that the parties recognize “the same
standards of right.”15 Sharp’s focus on justice claims in an
intercultural, historical and post-colonization context brings the
problem of a shared baseline to the fore. It is also one reason for
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Sharp’s sobering conclusion that “in conditions of biculturalism, strict
justice is actually impossible.”16
Strict justice may well be impossible in any case of gross
violence or systemic degradation, yet the question of how best to
conceive the measure of justice remains. Discussions of reparation
continue to invoke the ideal of corrective (or compensatory or
reparative) justice, which in turn is pulled inevitably toward legal
models of responsibility to compensate for wrongful harm. The basic
idea of “compensating” for harm is stretched in various practical,
symbolic or moral directions, or is assimilated to the compensatory
framework by referring to the “remedies” and “satisfaction” due to
victims of serious wrong, staying with the fundamental idea of “giving
back” in order to set right.17 Given the limitations of the framework of
corrective justice, I explore the potential of another, less
philosophically familiar picture of justice.

Restorative Justice: A Conception and its Values
Restorative justice is not yet part of the shared philosophical
language of justice theory. Nor does restorative justice sit easily with
the priority of “ideal theory” that has controlled much thinking about
justice in the late twentieth century. Ideal theory was identified by
Rawls as the necessary starting point of justice theory. Ideal theory
assumes a “well-ordered society” in which “everyone is presumed to
act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions.”18 Within the
Rawlsian framework compensatory justice is essentially part of “partial
compliance theory” that deals with injustice. Restorative justice begins
from and defines itself in terms of the reality of violation, alienation,
and disregard among human beings. Its central concept of “restoring
relationships” supposes that it is disregard or violation of acceptable
human relationships that stands at the core of its agenda, practically
and philosophically.
Restorative justice was introduced to many for the first time
when it was invoked as the guiding conception of South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.19 The theory and practice of
restorative justice, however, began two decades earlier in criminal
justice applications with experiments such as victim-offender
mediation programs and forms of family or community conferences. I
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suggest that six central restorative justice values repeat throughout an
extensive and growing literature.20
1. Restorative justice aims above all to repair the harm
caused by wrong, crime, and violence.
2. Restorative justice makes central the experiences and
needs (material, emotional, and moral) of victims.
3. Restorative justice insists on genuine accountability
and responsibility-taking from those who are responsible
for harm, ideally directly to those who have suffered the
harm.
4. Restorative justice seeks to return ownership of the
resolution of wrong, crime, and harm to those primarily
affected and those who can in turn effect meaningful
repair: to those who have done wrong or are responsible
for harm, to victims, to immediate communities of care
of victims and offenders, and to larger affected or
interested communities.
5. Restorative justice aims at offering those responsible
for wrong and harm the opportunity through
accountability and repair to earn self-respect and to be
reintegrated without stigma into their communities.
6. Restorative justice seeks to build and strengthen
individuals’ and communities’ capacities to do justice
actively, and not to surrender the role of doing justice to
experts, professionals, or “the state,” which should play
facilitating roles.
These core values serve the ultimate aim and guiding norm of
restorative justice, “restoring relationships.” In restorative justice what
demands repair is a state of relationship between a victim and
wrongdoer, and among each and his or her community that has been
distorted, damaged or destroyed. Serious harm to individuals creates a
relationship charged with powerful negative feelings and burdened
with losses that can continue to mar a victim’s life. Restorative justice
targets a situation of negative connection or disconnection that might
be an ongoing source of threat, insult, anger, fear, and grief.21 It is not
always possible, nor is it always desirable, to restore relationship
between those who have done or allowed harm and those who have
suffered at their hands or by their indifference or carelessness. In
some cases where restoration between victims and offending persons
Journal of Social Philosphy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 2006): pg. 377-395. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

9

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

is possible it can nevertheless mean only a wary coexistence. In any
case, however, it is necessary to attempt to restore morally habitable
conditions for those wronged within their supporting network of
relationships and in their communities. At a minimum, others must
acknowledge the wrong and harm done to victims and accept the
legitimacy of victims’ demands for recognition and redress. Where
some bear responsibility (in any of several ways) for the wrong done
to others, apology, combining acknowledgment of wrong,
responsibility for wrong and repudiation of wrong, is in order.22
Resentment of victims’ claims to repair, victim-blaming or indifference
to a victim’s violation and suffering is the antithesis of restoration: it
tells the victim that the wrong is denied or that he or she does not
matter.
The terminology of “restoration” is sometimes criticized because
it implies return to a condition of relationship that either did not exist
or was unacceptable.23 I propose that we understand “restoration” in
all contexts as normative: “restoration” refers to repairs that move
relationships in the direction of becoming morally adequate, without
assuming a morally adequate status quo ante. Morally adequate
relations are ones in which three conditions obtain. In them, people
are confident that they share some basic standards for the treatment
of each other. People are able to trust each other to abide by those
standards or at least to acknowledge fault if they (or others) do not
abide by them. And so, finally, people are entitled to be hopeful that
unacceptable treatment will not prevail, that unacceptable behavior
will not be defended or ignored where it occurs, and that victims will
not be abandoned in their reliance on our shared commitment to our
standards and to each other.24
The ideal of restorative justice is that its values should be
expressed both in the structure of processes of dealing with violence
and injustice and in the outcomes of doing so. Paradigmatic restorative
justices practices, such as victim-offender dialogue, group
conferences, truth commissions, or apologies (personal or public), not
only aim at adequate forms of relationship as an outcome but require
participants to act out the morally adequate relationships at which
they aim. The practices involve responsive and respectful forms of
encounter, interaction, and expression, such as offenders directly
facing and hearing victims; victims being able to confront offenders
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and to seek information directly from offenders about what happened
and why they were targeted, information that is often critical to
victims’ own understanding, peace of mind, and sense of
blamelessness. Offenders, too, are able to represent themselves, and
in doing so may be able to represent their own human vulnerabilities
and their regret or shame as well as their willingness to apologize and
make amends, affirming their competence and self-respect as moral
agents. In some formats other participants encourage more honest,
responsive, and responsible interaction between victim and offender,
and they can exert pressure as well as provide support for plans of
restitution, compensation, or service that aim at repair.
A corrective justice framework tends to make compensation –
making good a victim’s loss – central, with pressures toward defining a
metric of loss and, ideally, compensation in some proportion to loss.
There are familiar challenges for this approach, including the obscurity
of counterfactual claims about what victims “would have” had, and
puzzles about how much of what they might have had they now
deserve to receive.25 Many serious harms and injustices, such as the
murder of a loved one or the expropriation of a people’s land and
destruction of their language and culture due to genocidal practices of
colonization, create losses that are not literally compensable at all.
Restorative justice, too, emphasizes material and practical amends
that address victims’ losses and needs, but restitution and
compensation in a restorative framework play instrumental and
symbolic roles in repairing relationships, including the role of adding
weight to expressive interpersonal gestures such as apology and
expressions of sorrow, shame, guilt or desire to relieve the victims’
pain and anger. The direct concern of restorative justice is the moral
quality of future relations between those who have done, allowed, or
benefitted from wrong and those harmed, deprived or insulted by it. In
some cases compensation or restitution will be indispensable to signify
full recognition, respect and concern to victims. In other contexts
material reparation might be unnecessary, and in no cases is it, by
itself, sufficient for signaling appropriate moral regard. Compensation
by itself need not signal responsibility for injury, much less regret or
atonement by those responsible. Without a surrounding framework of
respectful acknowledgment, responsibility and concern, compensation
can take on insulting, condescending or dismissive meanings. The
nature and meaning of restitution or compensation in restorative
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justice should emerge from a practice of communication centered on
the needs and understandings of victims as well as wrongdoers’
deepened understanding of the nature and meaning of the victims’ loss
and of the nature and extent of their own responsibility.
A second difference between restorative justice and corrective
justice approaches concerns the common phenomenon of denial,
evasion, or minimizing of responsibility by those implicated in
wrongdoing. Corrective justice, like retributive justice, requires that
responsibility of particular parties be established in order to determine
who must or should “pay” for wrong, through punishment or
compensation. Ironically, this almost guarantees that the “bigger” the
injustice the more contested will be the antecedent premises of
responsibility. The more massive, collectively supported or tolerated,
or historically extended an injustice is, the easier it will be to argue
that assignments of responsibility are unclear, incoherent or unfair,
and so that arguments for large-scale redress cannot get started, or
measures of redress are narrowly targeted to a few parties.
Restorative justice practices by contrast typically create the conditions
to leverage responsibility, that is, to move people from a minimal or
peripheral sense of connection and responsibility to a richer and more
demanding perception of what harms the wrong does and how they
might be related to it.
In restorative justice practices that address ordinary crime, such
as victim-offender mediation, conferences, or peacemaking circles,
once offenders and other responsible or concerned parties are willing
to engage in restorative justice practice, it is common for this
movement toward greater and broader acceptance of responsibility to
occur. Those who have already assumed some responsibility come to a
deepened sense of the reality, extent and consequences of what they
have done to another human being. It is also common for others
concerned, such as families or communities, to begin to see
themselves as implicated, either by connections they have not before
examined or admitted, or by a realization that they can make a
difference by contributing to or assisting with some form of repair.
Victims along with others may want to take an active role in the
restorative outcome or in a continuing process of repair. Restorative
practice is thus dynamic with respect to responsibility. It may not be
necessary to establish responsibility extensively, exclusively or
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certainly in order to engage in restorative justice; restorative justice
practice may be the a way to discover, induce, deepen, extend, and
clarify responsibilities that are unnoticed, resisted or denied at the
outset of a process, or have been reassuringly assigned to some small
number of target individuals. Institutional, governmental, and
community exercises in restorative justice, including projects of finding
and telling truths, create the opportunity and the medium for apparent
responsibilities to be acknowledged , but also for additional
responsibilities, both backward and forward looking, to be discerned
and accepted.26
A third feature of restorative justice lies in its fostering a full
exploration of the nature and impact of the wrong and of the rupture
in relationship that explains it or results from it. Communicative
interaction and voice for victims, whether in the form of a face to face
conference or in the form of an official truth process after political
violence, aims to create an adequate description of the wrong which is
essential to assessing the requirements of repair. Trudy Govier points
to research that shows a substantial “magnitude gap” between victims
and perpetrators (and sometimes, we might note, between either and
third parties) in evaluating the seriousness of harms.27 As injustices
grow in magnitude, violence, and historical duration the reality,
nature, intent and seriousness of violations becomes predictably
contested, and the need for a careful and detailed articulation of the
full story of violence, oppression, terror or subjugation becomes both a
reparative activity and a measure of the adequacy of other measures
of repair.
Finally, restorative justice makes communities of varying sizes
and descriptions central in several ways. Communities may be
harmed, materially and morally, by wrongs to their members and to
their resources, including their moral resources of trust and
hopefulness. Communities can also serve as actors or as guarantors of
repair and restoration of relationships. When individuals primarily
responsible for wrongs and harms are unavailable or are unwilling to
accept responsibility and to seek to redress their wrongs, restoration
may devolve to communities or networks within communities. Indeed,
the emphasis in restorative justice on catalyzing and strengthening the
capacity of individuals and communities to do justice in the wake of
wrongdoing suggests that official actors in the legal system or
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government are by no means the only actors and should not always be
the principal actors in attempting to bring justice to bear. Restorative
justice encourages “bottom-up” efforts at justice, while not excluding
official roles or responsibilities. Restorative justice supports not a zerosum but a “both-and” approach to responsibility for restoration of
relations.
The idea of “community” is used very flexibly in restorative
justice, but there is a practical basis for allowing the identification of
the relevant community in context. The harmed community and the
community that can effectively respond to support repair need not be
the same collectivity. It might be that neither community possesses an
organizational structure and executive function to undertake actions
corporately and representatively; the relevant collectivities might be
relatively unstructured or informal, like a locality or neighborhood. The
community that can effectively respond need not do so, or even be
able to do so, corporately; it might be that its members or some
groups of members act out of it, or on its behalf, or in its name. And
there might also be multiple responsible communities, some
institutionally embodied and represented, and others not, that can and
should play roles in addressing and redressing injustice. In some
restorative justices practices in the criminal context, like forms of
conferencing or peacemaking circles, the community or communities
can encompass individuals and groups that see themselves as harmed
by the crime, others that have reason for concern, and others still who
are potential sources of support and guarantee of plans for repair in
which they themselves might or might not participate. In a restorative
justice perspective, communities that matter can be multiple and
differently situated with respect to a crime or injustice. Relevant
communities might not be given in advance but rather formed in
response to the demands of doing justice in the wake of specific
wrongs.28

Black Redress and a Restorative Justice
Perspective
I want to illustrate very briefly the productive nature of a
restorative justice perspective for one kind of case where a shared
moral baseline has never been firmly and reliably in effect. The case is
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the failure of “black redress,” to use Roy Brooks’s succinct phrase for
the need in the United States to address and redress several hundred
years of enslavement, legal subjugation and exclusion and legally
tolerated exposure to violence extending from the seventeenth to the
mid-twentieth century. This history of injustice arguably continues
today in society’s acquiescence in persisting and repeatedly
documented inequalities of wealth, health, freedom, civic respect and
life-prospects for African-Americans, and in widespread resistance to
and resentment of the topic of reparations for slavery and its sequels
in the general – majority white – public. I do not undertake here to
repeat the history of cruel and profound injustice punctuated by
opportunities and failures to repair that others have ably provided.29
What I add here is that restorative justice identifies the problem and
the path to reparation in a way better suited to this kind of case than
does the corrective model.
Restorative justice targets the damage or distortion in
relationship that is both a cause and an effect of wrongs. A problem
that lies at the heart of the continuous and continuing sequence of
enslavement, legal subjugation and persisting exposure to violence,
discrimination and neglect of enslaved Africans in America and AfricanAmerican citizens is the profound distortion of relationship, socially and
emotionally, between the still rigid and polarized raced groups, “black”
and “white,” that are constituted by this very distortion. A deep and
unexamined contempt of whites for blacks is the most salient and
disturbing symptom of the distortion. The attitude of contempt ranges
from the benign contempt of indifference to the history, current
condition and future of African-Americans to the angry contempt of
defensive hostility and overt racism of many whites toward blacks,
especially when asked to pay attention to the history or present
conditions of injustice. Focusing on white attitudes to blacks, however,
is both incomplete and deceptive; the legacy of race and white
supremacist racism also decisively shapes the self-understanding of
whites. The contempt of indifference allows whites not to feel that they
are part of an urgent present problem and allows whites to be illinformed and uncurious, or complacently but often mistakenly
confident, in what they know about the history and legacies of racial
oppression. It allows whites to think of the history of race in America
as something that happened to African-Americans and not what
happened to whites. Part of the self-understanding of whites, as
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decades of critical race theory reveals, is not to know what whiteness
means; to think that race and racial oppression has to do with blacks
and other non-white people; and to feel right-minded in condemning
unconscionable things that were done to African-Americans “long ago,”
even though legally enforced segregation is within the memory of
many living individuals who have never received reparation.30 For
African-Americans, the basis for earned trust in whites is lacking;
worse, its emergence is undermined by continuing evidence of racism
and the persistence of the denial or minimization of the reality of
racism still common in white America, as well as indifference or
hostility to appeals for reparation that reappear punctually throughout
American history from slavery times.31 Deeper lies the assault on the
hopefulness of many African-Americans who face reduced life chances
and the reality that their children may for another generation contend
with the insults and obstacles of racism, and the results of poverty,
poor education, crime and incarceration, that others blithely ignore or
deny.32
A telling symptom of a disconnected, evasive or hostile attitude
of white Americans to the unredressed history of injustice to AfricanAmericans is reported opposition among white Americans toward a
U.S. government apology for slavery or that larger history. Polls
continue to show heavy white opposition to – and black support for –
an official national apology for slavery.33 Apology is the most minimal
but unambiguous and foundational gesture of repair. Not to apologize
is to fail to accept, and refusal to apologize is to deny, the fact of the
wrong, the seriousness of the wrong, responsibility for the wrong,
repudiation of the wrong, or all of these.34 Official apologies,
furthermore, not only acknowledge and accept responsibility for a past
wrong, but typically serve to signal a recognized need to re-establish
institutional moral credibility, an intent to establish a certain version of
events as the official story, and a public resolve to accept a correct
moral standard for future conduct.35 To resist an official apology
reveals opposition to this definitive public correction of course. Another
dimension of apology, often crucial to its effect but not always
adequately noted, is the empathetic function of apology. Apologies are
often inadequate or disappointing to the one harmed if they do not
manage to convey appreciation of the suffering, anger, mistrust or
grief the victim experiences as a result of the wrong.36 To refuse
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apology can mean refusing to acknowledge that these universal human
responses to injury and disrespect are fitting.
There are compelling arguments for responsibility of the U.S.
government as a continuing institution that bears responsibility for its
roles in accepting and protecting slavery and then in legitimating the
degraded Jim Crow citizenship that currently living individuals and
communities have endured.37 I agree that the federal government is
an appropriate and important locus of responsibility for apology and
further reparative measures. Yet restorative justice, while not rejecting
the importance of moral responsibilities of government, offers a
distinctive perspective: justice is done both in and by restoring moral
relationship and so affirming, perhaps for the first time, a truly shared
moral baseline of reciprocal responsibility and equal dignity.
Governmental actions alone are not adequate to that task, and
government action on more local – state and municipal – levels might
represent in a more immediate way communities with which people
identify, especially if those communities address their own local
histories of racial violence, exploitation or exclusion. Institutions like
corporations, churches and universities are other localities for the
identification and exploration of unredressed racial wrongs.
At the same time, the “restoration of relationship” sought within
restorative justice terms, pursued on local levels by governmental,
institutional and civic initiatives, could create better conditions for the
pursuit of national reparations, material and symbolic, for AfricanAmericans. Putting a priority on historical inquiry, dialogue and voice
of those concerned or affected, and inviting active engagement in the
present with the past, opens opportunities that restorative justice
distinctively seeks. There can be fuller articulation of wrongs,
discovery of their consequences and space for acknowledgment of
responsibilities of various kinds, including past involvement or
acquiescence in unacceptable practices, recognition of benefits from
racial inequality, irresponsible or defensive ignorance of facts, or the
ability to contribute to changing the future. Legacies of racial violence
and oppression will predictably have affected African-Americans in
immediate ways (including incidents of violence and victimization that
may have remained unknown in families and communities) but may
also have affected whites and other racial minorities negatively. Past
cooperative efforts across racial lines might also come into focus
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alongside practices that used race to stigmatize and humiliate citizens.
Local initiatives can explore forms of reparation – memorials,
celebrations, history projects, museums, educational programs,
genealogy projects, public art, dramatic performance, and others –
that meaningfully address the nature of wrongs and moments of
constructive change in particular communities whose identities and
boundaries might be reconfigured by such initiatives.

Conclusion: Untangling Relations and Incubating
Reparations
I have described restorative justice as an approach to
reparations that could be adopted, but I was prompted to think about
the restorative justice and reparations by reflecting on an actual surge
in local initiatives to deal with unredressed racial injustice and violence
against African-Americans in the past ten to fifteen years.
The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, America’s
first self-named truth commission, is a privately financed project to
examine the 1979 shootings of five anti-racist community activists by
Klansmen and neo-Nazis that will release its final report in May, 2006.
A 500-page report released in 2005 was commissioned by the General
Assembly of North Carolina to explore the overthrow by whites of the
government of the town of Wilmington, ending black participation in
local government until the civil rights era. The state of Florida passed a
compensation program in 1994 for survivors of a white race riot that
destroyed the town of Rosewood in 1923. An investigation of the Tulsa
Race Riot of 1921 in which whites destroyed the prosperous black
community of Greenwood published its report in 2002, recommending
reparations for survivors and descendants; reparations have so far not
been enacted. The state of Virginia recently matched private funds to
provide scholarships for state residents who were unable to continue
their education when Prince Edward County and other locales shut
down public schools in the 1950s rather than desegregate them.
Several cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles, have
passed ordinances requiring disclosure of links to slavery by
corporations receiving municipal business. Charleston, South Carolina,
is preparing to open the Old Slave Mart Museum in an original building
where slave auctions were held until 1863. In 2001, on the occasion of
the university’s 300th anniversary, three doctoral candidates at Yale
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University researched Yale’s use of slave-trade money and choices to
honor slave-traders and defenders of slavery in the naming of its
colleges. Ruth Simmons, Brown University’s first African-American
president, formed a University Steering Committee on Slavery and
Justice in 2003 to research Brown’s historical ties to slavery.
Prosecutors have reopened notorious civil rights era murder cases in
which indictments or convictions were impossible to secure at the
time, in what are appropriately named “atonement trials,” while states
have begun to consider mass or individual pardons for thousands of
people who violated segregation laws or were convicted due to racial
bias.
These developments might be seen as fragmentary justice or
alternative remedies where justice has failed. I suggest we see them
instead as multiple, local initiatives that might be better understood
under the rubric of restorative justice. These initiatives arise from or
address communities and institutions, in some cases through
government and law and in others through the effort or the leadership
of individuals. They aim to address victims or descendants, to
acknowledge buried or unredressed injustices, to create accountability,
to offer gestures or repair, to respond to the needs of living victims
and to memorialize victims who are beyond the reach of justice. Placed
within the framework of restorative justice, these efforts are parts of a
decentralized and incremental work of restoration and reparation that
seems fitted to the historical length, breadth and complexity of the
injustice in question. These actions might also build momentum toward
the passage of Representative John Conyers’ H.R. 40 proposal for a
national commission to examine the history and effects of slavery and
its sequels to the present day, to explore ways to educate the
American public and to study the question of reparations, itself a
measure in the spirit of restorative justice, inviting public dialogue and
seeking a fuller accounting of wrongs.
Whether or not a national apology or reparations are achieved in
the near or the longer term, diverse and dispersed initiatives at
different levels are particularly fitting in a case of deeply distorted
relations, mystifying and incomplete histories, and transgenerationally
entrenched alienation within and between groups. A striking model for
what is needed in such a case is provided in Manu Meyer’s discussion
of ho’oponopono, a traditional Hawaiian peacemaking practice that
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addresses troubled family relations. The practice aims at “examining
one layer at a time, of inching toward the source of trouble to untangle
emotion, actions, and motivations, which will, in turn, uncover yet
another, deeper layer of the same.”38 It requires a clear view of the
problem and a disciplined and guided work of “untangling” thoughts
and emotions that stand between people and in the way of
understanding and addressing the wrong or conflict. Could there really
be a shortcut through a process like this, given centuries of distorted
and violent racialized relations in the United States?
I have argued that restorative justice provides a more adequate
way to conceptualize injustice and its compounding causes and effects
over generations in a case such as the relationship between white
Americans and African-Americans. Restorative justice outlines a more
varied menu of mutually supporting ways of addressing such injustice
than does corrective justice as usually understood. My brief for the
superiority of restorative justice as an approach to reparations in
certain cases, however, need not be seen as completely excluding the
relevance of corrective justice. Conceptually, corrective justice might
be seen as a limit case of restorative justice where there has been a
local violation of a standing norm in the context of mutually
authoritative standards; in fact, the theory of restorative justice has
been developed largely within a criminal justice context as a way to
address victims’ rights to a direct and constructive response of
accountability and repair from offenders who have harmed them in a
particular criminal act. Practically, corrective justice and its idea of
compensation as an expression of responsibility may well be one
effective and familiar (and effective because familiar) concrete format
for signifying and sealing between parties an understanding of right
relationship, or a decisive step in the direction of such an
understanding, that had been lacking previously. Symbolically,
corrective justice may convey counterfactually the “restoration” of
what should have existed but in reality did not previously obtain. This
symbolism – of equal parties settling a debt required by their
reciprocal recognition under shared norms – might be particularly apt
at a certain point in cases where reparation, including
acknowledgments of and apologies for a history of varied and gross
mistreatment, comes very late: after a brutally oppressed, viciously
stigmatized and persistently disadvantaged group has survived and
struggled its way to recent formal equality, as is true of AfricanJournal of Social Philosphy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 2006): pg. 377-395. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been
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Americans. In order to perform this symbolic function, however, it will
likely have to consolidate a more varied and complex process of
historical accounting, acknowledgment, cultivating trust and making
amends for which restorative justice provides the rationale.39
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